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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND COMMON MARKET LAW 
The recent European Commission case in which the American-owned Continental 
Can company was ordered to divest itself of a Dutch competing company 
which it had acquired has pinpointed the complicated issue of restrictive 
trade practices in Common Market law. 
In a recent address in London, Dr. Willy Schlieder, the European 
Communities Director General for Competition, explained some of the details 
of that law. 
He emphasized that competition policy plays a major role in 
realizing the aims of the Market. During the last ten years, he said, 
the exchange of goods between member states had increased considerably, 
and there had been a profusion of transborder subsidiaries and other 
forms of international business cooperation. This development meant a 
greater choice and a better supply of goods and services for the consumer. 
Dr. Schlieder then outlined the aims of EC competition policy. The 
first aim was to maintain competition by applying the competition rules 
of the Rome treaties, and by controlling restrictive practices or the 
behavior of enterprises in a dominant position. The intention was to 
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achieve optimum use of production factors while safeguarding the interests 
of the consumer. 
A second aim, Dr. Schlieder said, was imperative if a common market 
was to be achieved: the Commission had to ensure that the trade barriers 
and other restrictions between member states that were removed were not 
replaced by private trade barriers. Open frontiers within the Community 
would be acceptable only if all enterprises faced equal conditions. 
This meant excluding legal or practical discrimination in the form of 
state monopolies with a commercial character and preventing state aid to 
industry from distorting competition. 
Although the Commission moved, in principle, against all agreements 
incompatible with the Rome treaties, it could and did grant exemption to 
cooperation agreements which were "economically sound". 
In most contravention cases, Dr. Schlieder said, the parties concerned 
voluntarily agreed to end restrictive arrangements or to adapt them to 
the rules; but the Commission had full discretion, subject only to the 
control of the Community's Court in Luxembourg, to decide what position it 
would take. 
Case Law Sets Guidelines 
Certain jurisprudential guidelines emerg~ from recent case decisions. 
Horizontal agreements between producers or dealers, with a view to 
allocating markets, customers or quotas, have never been exempted. An 
attempt by the German steel industry to obtain authorization for a 
quota system failed last year. Price-fixing agreements affecting trade 
between member states are rarely permitted. In a case involving quinine, 
an agreement to protect home markets within the Community was rejected; 
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the Commission imposed fines totaling approximately $500,000. In a 
dyestuffs case, no formal price agreement was proved, but concerted practices 
resulted in almost simultaneous price increases. Here again the 
participants were heavily fined but this case is under appeal. Also 
forbidden are horizontal agreements between firms of only one member state 
if they fix prices or resale conditions for imported and exported goods. 
Arrangements protecting national markets by use of collective agreements 
establishing exclusive reciprocal commercial relations in a single 
member state have also very little chance of winning exemption. 
Exemptions are granted, Dr. Schlieder said, if the disadvantages that 
result from a restrictive trade practice are counterbalanced by advdhtages 
to the general interest. For instance, a more flexible line was adopted 
by the Commission with regard to joint sale agencies for fertilizers. 
The Commission gave exemption to agreements on these lines because they did 
not concern exports to other EC member states. Dr. Schlieder's Directorate 
General is currently examining whether joint sales in home markets and in 
third countries·result in de facto protection of these EC home markets. 
In another case, exemption was giyen to an export association of 
French canned food producers because all the firms involved were small and, 
for practical purposes, unable to compete independently with bigger firms 
outside France. Dr. Schlieder said the EC Commission had taken a number of 
steps to facilitate cooperation between enterprises in cases where this 
was in the general interest. It had published a list of types of cooperation 
which are not restrictive and those not prohibited under Article 85 of the 
second Rome Treaty, such as the joint use of facilities concerning stocks, 
services, or transport, joint bookkeeping and market research, or joint 
advertising and cooperation by non-competitors selling through a joint 
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sales agency. 
The Commission has also ruled that agreements are not excluded under 
Article 85 if their economic importance is negligible. Negligible importance 
is defined as meaning not more than 5% of a market and/or an aggregate 
annual turnover for all members of a cartel of $15 million --$20 million in 
some cases. 
Block Exemptions 
The Commission was recently empowered by the EC Council to give certain 
block exemptions: there have been two agreements on specialization, and accords 
on standards or on the limitation of production to certain types, sizes 
and qualities of a product, as well as agreements concerning joint research. 
With regard to vertical agreements between producers and dealers, 
Dr. Schlieder said, the Commission has accepted certain restrictions and 
rejected others. In a case concerning Omega watches, it accepted the 
restriction of sales to a limited number of dealers only; but in a case 
involving Kodak, direct and indirect export prohibitions were disallowed. 
During 1971, the Commission reached 19 anti-trust decisions, 
considerably more than in any previous year. The most interesting of those 
decisions, Dr. Schlieder said, concerned license agreements in the field 
of commercial property rights and knowhow and agreements permitting abuse 
of dominant positions in a market. 
In a case involving Parke-Davis, the Community Court ruled that a 
Dutch patent holder for antibiotics could prevent imports into the 
Netherlands of similar patented products from Italy where they had been 
freely sold in the absence of any patent protection of pharmaceuticals 
in that country. The Court decided that unrestricted importation of the 
Italian antibiotics would have challenged the essence of the Dutch patent. 
The Court ruled that the objective of a unified common market could not 
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be achieved if industrial property rights could be invoked merely because 
they were still national in character. Differences in origin and 
purpose between various patents, trademarks and copyrights are critical 
in defining the subject matter of the different types of property 
rights which are protected by the Rome treaties; but they have no 
relevance to the basic question of whether the national character of 
industrial property rights is or is not a reason for forbidding the free 
circulation of protected goods within a common market, Dr. Schlieder 
said. 
He said the Commission would continue to apply Article 85 wherever 
enterprises, through agreements or concerted practices or by virtue of a 
dominant position, use industrial property rights to preserve the isolation 
of national markets.-- in effect, to prevent the common market from 
operating •. Two court decisions have prohibited the use of trademarks 
to restrain trade between member states. This jurisprudence does not 
apply if the parties exercise patent or trademark or similar rights to 
prevent dealers or consumers from buying protected products lawfully 
put into circulation in any part of the Community. 
In 1971 the Commission took two decisions referring to license 
agreements known as the Burroughs/Geha ~nd the Burroughs/Delplangue 
cases. The licensed product concerned is a new carbon paper produced in 
Italy, France and Germany. Both licensees, the French firm Delplanque and 
the German firm Geha, received non-exclusive production licenses for some 
patents and exclusive production licenses for others. There are no 
territorial restrictions on sales: Licensor and licensees sell the 
licensed products everywhere in the Common Market on a non-exclusive basis. 
The market share of the product amounts to about 10% in France and 
Germany. 
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In order to give guidelines to industry the Commission emphasized that 
in the case of a non-exclusive patent and know-how license the following 
obligations shall not be treated as restraints: 
1. The obligation to grant no sublicenses except to wholly dependent 
companies. The reason for this is obvious: only the owner of a patent 
right can authorize the exploitation of the patent. As far as know-how 
is concerned, the secret can only be guaranteed if the know-how is not 
communicated to third parties without the consent of its owner. 
2. The obligation to keep the know-how secret. The Commission permits 
this obligation, even for the time after the agreement has ended, as a· 
pre-requisite for commercializing know-how. 
3. The obligation imposed on the licensee not to use the know-how after 
the termination of the agreement. This has been accepted with some 
hesitation as it is difficult not to use knowledge. But it is one of the 
conditions of commercializing know-how in order to stimulate its 
communication. 
4. The obligation to produce the licensed products in sufficient quantities 
and to follow the technical instructions of the licepsor. These are 
deemed to be necessary to allow quantitatively sufficient and technically 
unobjectionable use of the right granted.to the patentee. 
5. The obligation to mark the products fabricated under the license so 
that their origin can be detected. This has been accepted in order to 
allow the licensor control of the quality and quantity of the products. 
6. The obligation to settle disputes by arbitration. 
The Commission has ruled that an exclusive license can be a 
restraint of trade under Article 85, because it restricts the ability 
of a patentee to exploit the patent and thus limits the access of non-
licensees to the new technology. The Commission has rejected the 
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notion of basing anti-trust considerations on the patentee's right to 
be excluded. This right describes the legal position of the patentee 
and the licensees but cannot, the Court has ruled, be used as an 
argument to justify restrictions that the licensor wishes to accept for 
himself. The Court has also indicated that the reservation of a 
reasonable reward to the inventor is also an important element in anti-trust 
considerations. 
If, from an economic point of view, an obligation is indispensable in 
order to make a licensing arrangement effective and to ensure the 
effectiveness of the patent concerned in accordance with the law on 
patents, the Commission will normally conclude that there is no restraint 
of trade, Dr. Schlieder said. If Article 85 applies, the final judgment of 
the validity of any particular restrictive covenant will be tested 
according to certain standards: 
Firstly, does the license agreement contribute to the improvement of 
the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical 
or economic progress guaranteeing to the consumers an equitable share 
of the profit? 
If the answer to this question is "yes" -- which, Dr. Schlieder said, 
would normally be the case and the ag~eement does not eliminate 
competition for a substantial part of the product market, the next 
question will be: 
Are the restrictions in the agreement indispensable to such 
improvements or to such promotion? The answer to this, he said, would be 
the crucial test for the exclusivity clause. If there were less 
restrictive ways to exploit the patent in the existing competitive 
situation, exemption would be refused. 
Dr. Schlieder said that this concept permitted the reconciliation 
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of the objectives of the patent system and of antitrust enforcement. Its 
practical result was that exclusive protection licenses could more 
easily be justified than the exclusivity clause in agreements providing 
an obligation for the licensee to license future pattmts or know-how in 
favor of the licensor --what is known as "grantback". 
Commission rulings are due soon on two other license cases. One 
concerns agreements between the American firm Davidson Rubber and 
Common Market licensees, the other an agreement between a French 
licensor and the Japanese firm Nagoya Rubber. These decisions will cover 
a "grantback" obligation and an export restriction imposed on a Japanese 
licensee. 
The Continental Can Case 
Last year the Commission took the first steps to apply Article 83 of the 
second Rome· treaty, on mergers. This article outlaws abuse of a dominant 
position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it. 
Jurisprudentially, the two most interesting cases concerned the American 
company, Continental Can, and GEMA, a German company representing 
composers of music which occupies a dominant position in Germany because 
it has no competitors for the exploitation of music copyright. 
The Commission found that GEMA was discriminating against citizens 
and companies of other EC member states. Foreign music publishers and 
German publishers depending on foreign companies were, for example, not 
admitted to membership in GEMA. In its ruling, the statutory 20-year 
period before a composer could hope to get payments out of the GEMA 
pension fund was reduced to five years, the obligation to go to arbitration 
was outlawed, and the vesting of pension rights was upheld in cases 
of cancellation of membership. GEMA is also no longer entitled to 
collect money for parts of records which do not involve copyrights or 
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for records imported or reimported into Germany by dealers, if copyright 
fees have already been paid in Germany or elsewhere in the Common Market. 
GEMA filed an appeal against the Commission's ruling, but later 
withdrew it. 
In the Continental Can case, the Commission held that the American 
company's acquisition of a Dutch competitor constituted an abuse of a 
dominant position. 
As early as 1966, a Commission memorandum on concentration had 
already expressed the opinion that any attempt to monopolize could be an 
abuse in the sense of Article 86, and said that Article 86 would not be 
applied only to cases of market behavior. 
Explaining this, Dr. Schlieder said that it was not mergers as such 
that were being criticized, but rather the elimination of actual. or 
potential competition through mergers with competitors. Furthermore, the 
application of Article 86 did not depend on a finding that the dominant 
position had been used in any way whatever to achieve this forbidden 
result, It was sufficient if a result incompatible with the purposes of 
the Rome Treaties was due to an action taken by an enterprise in a 
dominant position. 
According to the Commission, enterprises are in a dominant position 
when their scope for independent behavior is such that they can make 
their decisions without paying any real attention to competitors, buyers 
or suppliers. The Commission has ruled that this may occur if either their 
share of the market or their market share coupled with their technical 
knowledge, raw materials and capital, enable them to determine prices or 
to control production or distribution in a substantial part of the market. 
Dr. Schlieder said that the Continental Can decision, which asked the 
company to submit divestiture plans before July 1 of this year, was a 
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landmark in the history of EC anti-trust enforcement. 
Commenting on imminent British membership in the Community, Dr. 
Schlieder said that the accession treaties for the four new member states 
stipulated that the competition rules laid down in the Rome Treaties, as 
well as the implementing regulations, would be applicable to the enlarged 
Community as of January 1, 1973, in regard to all restrictive practices 
defined by those rules. Transitional arrangements would, however, 
cover situations already existing which become incompatible with 
Community rules by the act of accession. 
